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I. INTRODUCTION
For many religions homosexuality is a carnal sin. In fact, many religious
leaders preach and counsel openly against homosexuality. Many military
chaplains support this deeply embedded conviction.1 The repeal of “Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell” creates a clash between these military chaplains and the military’s
interest in eliminating discrimination against homosexuals. In the words of a
retired navy chaplain, “Chaplains are entitled to preach whatever they think is
necessary…but they certainly wouldn’t be allowed to go around speaking against
homosexuality… That would be counterproductive to good order and
discipline.”2
The repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” potentially raises two free speech
challenges chaplains might bring. First, there is an issue of censorship if chaplains
want to continue preaching, or counseling, against homosexuality and are
barred. Second, there may be a compelled speech claim if chaplains are forced to
counsel homosexual soldiers in a way that conflicts with their religious beliefs.
Chaplains’ preaching against homosexuality seems to contradict the military’s
interest of successfully outlawing discrimination against homosexuals, the very
purpose of repealing “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”. This clash will surely lead to a
contentious First Amendment battle whose resolution will likely be found in our
country’s highest tribunal. If these premonitions of constitutional objections to
either the revised, or existing law, or both, are in fact accurate, the Supreme
Court may face a very difficult legal question.
II. HISTORY OF CHAPLAINCY
The practice of military chaplaincy dates back to America’s Revolutionary
War. After the Constitution was ratified, Congress, through its enumerated
power to provide for the conduct of our national defense4, officially authorized
the already prevalent practice of military chaplains.5 The legitimacy of the
3

1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”, available at
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_gatesdadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20
101130(secure‐hires).pdf (last visited April 6, 2011) (explaining that “a large number of
military chaplains and their followers believe that homosexuality is a sin and an
abomination, and that they are required by God to condemn it as such.”)
2
Adelle M. Banks, Army Readies Chaplains before ‘Don’t Ask’ Repeal, USA TODAY, Mar.
25,
2011,http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2011‐03‐25‐army‐chaplains‐
gay_N.htm#uslPageReturn%23uslPageReturn.
3
Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.Supp.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
4
Id. at 225.
5
10 U.S.C. §3073 (Outlining the creation of Military Chaplains).
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chaplaincy was challenged, under the Establishment Clause, in Katcoff v. Marsh. 6
While the Supreme Court has not yet reached the issue, the court of appeals
held the chaplaincy did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.7 The Marsh court reasoned that, viewed in a historical context, the
framers of the Constitution did not perceive the military chaplaincy as an
Establishment Clause violation.8 Further, the court explained the necessity of
chaplains to motivate soldiers, maintain the morale, and alleviate soldiers’
personal stresses through spiritual support. 9 While the court was steadfast in its
rationale, it refused to shield the subject of the chaplaincy from all possible
future Constitutional challenges. 10 Still, the courts deference to the military
when facing constitutional challenges was clear.11 The Katcoff court explained,
“The line where military control requires that enjoyment of civilian rights be
regulated or restricted may sometimes be difficult to define. But caution dictates
when a matter provided for by Congress in the exercise of its warpower and
implemented by the Army appears reasonably relevant and necessary to
furtherance of our national defense it should be treated as presumptively valid
and any doubt as to its constitutionality should be resolved as a matter of judicial
comity in favor of deference to the military’s exercise of its discretion.” 12 The
question of the chaplaincy’s constitutionality has not since been addressed by
any higher courts. 13 The chaplaincy remains an active component of the United
States military, and the extensive regulations applicable to military chaplains
confirm this point.14
III. CURRENT APPLICABLE CHAPLAIN LAW
A crucial aspect of the military chaplaincy is a chaplain’s dual role as both
a religious leader and a staff director. 15 Chaplains staff responsibilities and
6

Katcoff, 755 F.Supp.2d at 234.
See Richard D. Rosen, Katcoff v. Marsh at Twenty‐Two: The Military Chaplaincy and the
Separation of Church and State, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2007) (describing the
“continued soundness” of Katcoff v. Marsh despite the lack of direct analysis by the
Supreme Court).
8
Id. at 232.
9
Id. at 228.
10
Rosen, supra note 7 (explaining the court’s remand of the case to determine whether
“government financing of military chaplaincy in limited areas … is constitutionally
permissible.”).
11
Katcoff, 755 F.Supp.2d at 234.
12
Id.
13
Rosen, Supra note 7, at 1142.
14
See U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. 165–1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army para.
4–3(2004)
[hereinafter
2004
AR
165‐1],
available
at
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r165_1.pdf.
15
2004 AR 165‐1, at para. 4–3.
7
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religious responsibilities are specifically designated in two separate chapters of
the military regulations. 16 While the chaplain’s roles are differentiated in the
military bylaws, the duties outlined by the separate chapters are all substantively
religious. 17 For example, chaplains’ staff responsibilities are essentially to advise
the commander on matters of religion, morals and morale in regards to religious
needs of assigned personnel, spiritual, ethical, and moral health of the
command, programs related to moral leadership, etc.18 These “staff”
responsibilities, while designated separately from religious responsibilities, are,
for the most part, religious in nature.
As for the chaplains’ expressly delegated religious responsibilities, their
overall mission is “to support religious spiritual, moral, and ethical needs of the
army.” 19 One of the more important regulations, in the context of this paper, is
the requirement of chaplains to counsel all soldiers who seek their advice. This
counseling obligation requires chaplains to be “available to all individuals,
families, and the command for pastoral activities and spiritual assistance”20, as
well as “contribute to the enrichment of marriage and family living by assisting in
resolving family difficulties.” 21 In addition, regardless of a chaplain’s religious
affiliation, all chaplains must “facilitate the free exercise rights of all
personnel.”22
While the chaplain directives ensure free exercise and no denominational
preference, there are regulations that protect the chaplains as well.23 In the
explanation of the chaplains’ religious responsibilities it is abundantly clear that
chaplains are not required to take part in any worship that is in contrast to their
faith. 24 The protection for chaplains however, only extends to preaching and
worship.25 Chaplains are required to be available for counseling and advice to all
command members, regardless of their own, or the individual command
members, religious affiliations.26

16

Id. para. 4–3, 4–4,4–5.
Id. para. 4–5(a)(1)–(6).
18
Id.
19
Id. para. 4–1.
20
Id. para. 4–4 (outlining how the chaplains will contribute to the spiritual well being of
soldiers).
21
Id.
22
Id. para 4–4(b); See also 2004 AR 165–11, at 3‐3 (explaining that the army does not
favor one religion over another and “[A]ll denominations are viewed as distinctive faith
groups, and all soldiers are entitled to chaplain support.”).
23
2004 AR 165‐11, at 4–4(e).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
2004 AR 165‐11, at 4–4.
17
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Seemingly, the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” would require some
revisions to the chaplain directives. In the bylaws, chaplains are required to
counsel all service members. However, chaplains may wish not to counsel about
homosexuality in a way that is contrary to their faith. For example, the repeal
may mean family counseling for gay couples. This requirement could be
problematic for those chaplains who are against counseling homosexual couples.
However, according to the Congressional Report on “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”, the
Pentagon is not recommending any changes in the existing chaplain law. 27 The
recent chaplain training, readying the chaplains for the implementation of the
repeal, echoes the Pentagon’s assurance that no changes in the bylaws will be
necessary. 28 Regardless of the Pentagon’s desire to maintain the status quo in
the current law, the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” will nonetheless raise free
speech issues, whether the law stays the same or not.
IV. FREE SPEECH APPLICABLE PRECEDENT
A. Government Employee Test
Any challenges brought by chaplains in regards to their speech, or
possibly even challenges assessing regulations, may be analyzed by the Supreme
Court as a government employee speech case. Essentially, the justification
behind restricting speech for government employees is the need for government
efficiency. More specifically, the government entity must be able to function
appropriately, and this sometimes requires limiting speech that may impair the
organizations’ ability to operate.29 In Connick v. Myers, the court succinctly
explains this underlying principle in saying, “[G]overnment officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”30 This need for government
efficiency is even more present in military operations. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in the case of Ethredge v. Hail states, “Courts
must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities of
a particular military interest.” 31 Simply put, the military is very obviously a
government operation, and those who work for the military are considered

27

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” available at
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_gatesdadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20
101130(secure‐hires).pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
28
Banks, supra note 2. (referring to the power point slides being presented to chaplains.
Specifically explaining that “The Chaplains Corps’ First Amendment freedoms and its
duty to care for all will not change).
29
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
30
Id.
31
Ethredge v. Hail, 56 F.3d 1324, 1328 (1995).
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government employees. Hence, military chaplains would likely be subjected to
the doctrinal government employee test established by the Supreme Court.
The current three part doctrinal test for government employees was
firmly established by the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 32 If the speech
is pursuant to employees’ official duties, it is government speech and is not
protected by the First Amendment.33 The First Amendment provides protection
for private speech, with certain limitations, but government speech is not
shielded in the same way.34 As the Garcetti court explains, “When public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”35
If the speech is not in pursuant to official duties, and is thus regarded as
private, the court must next decide whether or not the speech was on a matter
of public concern.36 If the speech is not on a matter of public concern it is not
protected.37 If the speech does address a matter of public concern it is subject to
the balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board of Education.38 This balancing
test essentially determines whether or not the speech is unduly disruptive.39 In
order to ascertain whether or not that speech is unduly disruptive, the
individuals right to free expression must be balanced with the government
entity’s ability to function.40 As the court in Pickering articulated, “The problem
in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of… a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.”41 In summary, in order for a government employee’s speech to
be protected, the speech must not be in pursuant to an official duty, it must be
on a matter of public concern, and it cannot be unduly disruptive.42

32

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 (2006).
Id. at 1960.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Connick, 461 U.S. 138 at 1690.
37
Id.
38
Pickering v. Board of Education, 390, U.S. 986, 88 (1967).
39
Id. See also Connick, 461 U.S. 138.
40
Pickering 390, U.S. 986 at 568.
41
Id.
42
Id. See also Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Garcetti 547 U.S. 410 at 126.
33
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B. Precedent Regarding Military Chaplains in Particular

The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the free speech rights of
military chaplains. In fact, very few courts have ruled on this issue.43 The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on the issue in 1997 in the
case of Rigdon v. Perry.44 In this case, the court held that a Chaplain’s free
speech rights were violated when the Air Force prevented chaplains from orally
urging command members to write Congress regarding pending abortion
legislation.45 The facts of this case are fairly parallel to the situation military
chaplains are facing now. The chaplain in this case was forced to choose
between his faith, which require he oppose abortion openly, and his employer
directives, which required him to be neutral on political matters.46 Chaplains
here are forced to choose between their faith, which requires opposition to
homosexuality, and the speech restrictions inherent in the implementation of
the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”.
Since this case was decided before Garcetti, and also analyzed the
constitutionality of regulations, not speech, the Rigdon court did not determine
whether or not the chaplain’s speech was pursuant to their official duties.47
Instead, the court drew a distinction between a chaplains acting in their religious
capacity versus their official capacity.48 The court reasoned that when [chaplains]
are acting in their religious capacity, they are not acting as representatives of the
military or on official duty.49 Further, the Rigdon court explained, “Military
chaplains can in fact have communications with their congregants solely in their
religious capacity, regardless of the fact that they have an official status as
members of the military.”50 The court never explicitly articulates that when
speech falls under a chaplain’s religious capacity, it is private, because the
Rigdon court is analyzing the constitutionality of the regulations on speech,
43

See Klingenschmitt v. Winter, No. 06CV1832 (2006), dismissed (holding the alleged
free speech violation for being forced to practice pluralistic religion could not be
reached because the chaplain failed to properly amend his complaint after losing his
endorsement.) see also Veitch v. Danzig, 135 F.Supp.2d 32 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding the
alleged free speech violation could not be reached by the court because ultimately the
chaplain’s dismissal was for disrespect of a superior officer and not disagreement over
divine doctrine).
44
Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F.Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997).
45
Id.
46
Steven H. Aden, The Navy’s Perfect Storm: Has a Military Chaplaincy Forfeited its
Constitutional Legitimacy by Establishing Denominational Preferences?, 31 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 185, 199 (2004).
47
Rigdon, 962 F.Supp. 150.
48
Id. at 159.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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rather then speech itself.51 However, the rationale indicates that chaplain’s
speech, in their religious capacity, is private, because if it was government
speech, it would receive no First Amendment protection, and the regulations
would be upheld.52
In addition, in order for the Rigdon court to proceed to forum analysis, as
they do, the regulations must be viewed as restricting solely private speech. This
is because forum analysis only comes into the picture when private speech is
being assessed.53 Courts use forum analysis to determine the protection that the
private speech is granted in a given situation.54 For example, a court must
determine whether the forum is public, non‐public, or designated in order to
resolve the level of scrutiny given to the speech.55 However, when the speech is
classified as government speech, forum analysis is not necessary.56 Therefore,
the fact that the Rigdon court reached the question of forum infers that the
speech was classified as private. Finally, the Rigdon court does speak to the
general principle of deference to the military.57 However, the court notes that
the defendants failed to show how the chaplains’ speech would threaten the
loyalty and morale of the military, and therefore, the regulations could not be
upheld.58
C. Precedent Regarding Prison Chaplains in Particular
The free speech rights of prison chaplains also have not been addressed
by the Supreme Court, but have been analyzed by the District Court of Ohio in
Akridge v. Wilkinson.59 Similar to Rigdon, this case was decided prior to Garcetti,
and therefore the court did not analyze whether or not the speech was pursuant
to the chaplain’s official duties.60 In contrast to Rigdon, this court was analyzing
51

Id. at 152.
Contra Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military
Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 164 (2007) (concluding that
“Despite the language in Rigdon, the decision does not stand for the proposition that
the speech of chaplains in faith group worship is equivalent, for purposes of
constitutional analysis, to private religious speech. Instead, the decision interprets
specific restrictions on the content of official speech and finds that the policies
underlying the restrictions do not apply to religious speech of chaplains in the context of
faith group worship.”).
53
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
54
Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
55
Id.
56
Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
57
Perry Education Assn., 460 U.S. 37, at 162.
58
Id.
59
Akridge v. Wilkinson, 178 Fed.Appx.474, 2006 WL 1112855 (C.A.6 (Ohio)).
60
Id.
52
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the constitutionally of the speech, rather then a regulation.61 Therefore, the
Akridge court did use the government employee analysis established in Pickering
and Connick.62 In Akridge, the chaplain prevented a gay inmate from leading the
choir band in a Protestant service.63 Akridge specifically said, “I didn’t know you
were gay. But since you tell me you are gay, then that is reason enough for you
not to … lead the band.”64 The court found the speech about homosexuality to
be a mixed matter of public and private concern and therefore subjected the
speech to the Pickering analysis.65 The court held that under the Pickering
balancing test, the speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection because
it undermined prison officials legitimate interests in preventing discrimination on
basis of sexual orientation and interests in the ordered administration of the
institution and its policies.66
The chaplains in this instance are therefore facing a body of law that is
not perfectly clear. While the Supreme Court has established the government
employee test, they have never reached the questions about the legitimacy of
the chaplaincy, the free speech rights of chaplains in the military, or the free
speech rights of prison chaplains. Lower courts have addressed all of these
questions but reached different conclusions.67 While the legitimacy of the
military chaplaincy is relatively sound, the free speech rights of chaplains are
much more controversial. Rigdon classified chaplain speech as private, while
Akridge found it to be unprotected speech.68 However, neither lower court used
the Garcetti analysis. This is applicable precedent the Supreme Court will be
analyzing when presented with the question at hand.
V. FRAMING CHAPLAINS’ FREE SPEECH CLAIMS
Chaplains have the ability to frame their claims in two main ways. They
could bring a censorship claim, essentially a paradigmatic free speech violation.
The First Amendment is explicit in its wording that “Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech.”69 As such, censorship is the most classic
example of a free speech violation. This would occur if chaplains were unable to
preach or advise against homosexuality. A censorship claim could be brought if
chaplains were fired and asked the court to analyze their speech. A censorship
61

Id. at 476.
Id. at 478.
63
Id. at 476
64
Id.
65
Id. at 478.
66
Id. at 480.
67
See Akridge 178 Fed.Appx.474, 2006 WL 1112855 (C.A.6 (Ohio)). See also Rigdon, 962
F.Supp. 150.
68
Akridge 178 Fed.Appx.478, 2006 WL 1112855 (C.A.6 (Ohio)).
69
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
62
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claim could occur if chaplains wanted to challenge existing regulations or a
hypothetical regulation forbidding chaplains from counseling soldiers that
homosexuality was a sin. The latter of these two regulations could also framed as
a compelled speech claim, requiring chaplains to counsel soldiers positively
about homosexuality, and will be discussed in that section. Chaplains could bring
compelled speech claims both if they were fired for failure to follow regulations
or if they wished to challenge the constitutionality of the restrictions.
VI. CENSORSHIP AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE ANALYSIS
A. Pursuant to Official Duties
The Garcetti court holds that when a government employee is acting
pursuant to his official duties, his speech is not protected under the First
Amendment.70 The court notes in making this determination, however, that it is
not dispositive that a view is being expressed at the workplace or that the
subject matter of the speech concerns employment.71 Rather, the threshold
matter is that a government employee is someone who goes to work and
performs the tasks he or she is paid to perform, and if that task is part of what
the employee is employed to do, it is pursuant to official duties.72 The court did
however, decline to create a bright line rule for defining the scope of what
employee duties actually are.73 If the court, in analyzing the speech of chaplains,
chooses to accept the Garcetti analysis, the first conclusion would be that
chaplains are government employees and they are paid for their duties. Further,
the tasks the chaplains perform, preaching and advising, are part of what they
are employed to do. 74Therefore, chaplains are in fact preaching and advising
pursuant to their official duties, and their speech would be considered
government speech. This conclusion could suggest that if chaplains were fired
for preaching or advising against homosexuality, their termination would be
constitutional. While this holding is possible, some of the dicta in the Garcetti
opinion may be helpful to the chaplains. As Reed notes, the majority opinion
addressed the fact that if public employees wish to express their grievances, they
could create “internal venues” for doing so.75 The chaplains may point to this in
their argument because creating an internal venue for expressing their dislike of
homosexuality is not feasible in the military setting.

70

Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410 at 1960.
Id. at 1964.
72
Id. at 1960.
73
Id. at 1961.
74
2004 AR 165–11.
75
Jessica Reed, Note, From Pickering to Ceballos: The Demise of the Public Employee
Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 118 (2007).
71
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The Rigdon court creates a distinction between a military chaplain’s
official conduct and religious conduct.76 This idea of two distinct roles is not a
foreign concept, as many of the military’s regulations separate the two types of
duties.77 The issue the Rigdon court struggles with is defining these distinct
roles.78 As explained in the section about current applicable chaplain law,
separating religious and official conduct is often difficult because even under the
military bylaws, all chaplain duties are substantively religious and the separation
of the roles is vague at best.79 Regardless, the Rigdon court must solidify these
separate categories in order to establish the extent of the free speech protection
for chaplains.
In attempting to separate these roles, the Rigdon court relies on the
status of military chaplains as explained in the pertinent regulations. 80
Specifically, the court refers to the chaplains’ legal status as “rank without
command.”81 Relying on this categorization, the court creates the distinction
between chaplains’ military and religious responsibilities.82 Aden elaborates on
this point in saying, “The court drew a clear distinction between a chaplain’s
exercise of military authority, authority severely limited by dearth of command
status, and his exercise of religious authority as a representative of a religious
denomination and counselor to willing participations…”83 The Rigdon court relies
on the chaplains explanation that due to his military status, “rank without
command”, if the chaplain did have a problem with personnel, he could not
pursue “disciplinary action” himself, but rather would have to approach a
commanding officer.84 Based on this the Rigdon court concludes that the only
possible solution is to distinguish a chaplains religious roles from the official
roles.85

76

Rigdon, 962 F.Supp. 150 at 159.
2004 AR 165–11 (distinguishing between chaplains staff responsibilities and religious
responsibilities).
78
Rigdon, 962 F.Supp. 150 at 159.
79
CDR William A. Wildhack III, CHC, USNR, Navy Chaplains at the Crossroads: Navigating
the Intersection of Free Speech, Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection, 51
Naval L. Rev. 217 (2005) (highlighting the overlap between religious and official duties
for chaplains). See also Kenneth J. Schweiker, Note, Military Chaplains: Federally Funded
Fanaticism and the United States Air Force Academy, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 5, 26
(2006) (explaining how the job descriptions for chaplains are too “open ended” and will
only end in “disaster.”).
80
Rigdon, 962 F.Supp. 150 at 157.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 159.
83
Aden, supra note 46, at 201.
84
Rigdon, 962 F.Supp. 150 at 157.
85
Id.
77
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One of the primary reasons the Rigdon court supplies to distinguish
religious duties from official duties is the idea that preaching is not an order and
therefore not an official duty. The military was attempting to have the court
characterize the religious speech here as an order, so that the speech would fall
in the category of “official conduct”, and therefore be government speech,
which could be regulated.86 The military argues that soldiers may “feel
constrained to adhere to what may be perceived as an ‘order’ from a …
chaplain.”87 The court dismisses this argument by reasoning that “[the idea] that
parishioners might interpret religious sermonizing as a military order defies
common sense.”88 The court explains that if chaplains were in fact giving orders
when speaking religiously soldiers would be required to believe in things such as
the resurrection of Jesus or the idea that Moses wrote the Torah.89
After the Rigdon court distinguishes the two roles, they find that
chaplains speech to be religious, rather then official.90 The explanation for this
finding lies in the courts narrow interpretation of an official duty.91 This is the
main difference between the Rigdon and Garcetti courts’ analysis. In Rigdon, the
court dismisses the military’s claim that, since the chaplain’s primary duties are
religious functions, when they perform them, they are acting in their official
duty.92 This directly opposes the broader understanding of official duty in
Garcetti, which is, if the task is part of what the employee is employed to do, it is
in fact an official duty.93 However, similar to the Garcetti analysis, the court here
does not create a bright line rule between what is and what is not an official
duty.94 Yet, the Rigdon court does reason that some of the words the chaplains
utter are not an official act taken “under the color of the military.”95 In essence,
the Rigdon court seems to be concluding that a chaplain’s official conduct could
be government speech, but solely religious conduct is private speech.96
Finally, the Rigdon court seems to be applying the idea of acting in a
religious capacity to both preaching and advising.97 Throughout the opinion the
court refers specifically to “preaching” or “conducting worship”, yet when
discussing the fact that religious speech is not an order, the court explains, “If a
86
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chaplain were to say to a congregant who had confessed to having a bitter
argument with his wife, ‘Go and forgive her, and say ten Hail Mary’s, surely this
could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered the issuance of a
military order…”98 This assertion indicates that when the court is discussing this
dual role of official conduct and religious conduct, advising falls in the latter
category.
There are two possibilities that could occur if the court accepts the
Rigdon analysis of the “dual role” and concludes that the chaplain’s speech
against homosexuality is purely private speech. If the Supreme Court chose to
follow this analysis then religious preaching may not be considered in pursuant
to official duties, and would be a communication solely in the chaplains’ religious
capacity. The likely path the court would take is to finish the rest of the doctrinal
test for a government employee. Meaning, the court would proceed to analyze
whether the speech was on a matter of public concern under Connick, and
whether the speech was unduly disruptive by assessing its value in the Pickering
balancing test.99 Since Connick and Pickering are the controlling Supreme Court
cases, it is highly unlikely the Court would follow the analysis of Rigdon any
further then possibly accepting Rigdon’s suggestion that religious speech is
private speech.100
The second possibility, in the unlikely event that the court chooses to
follow Rigdon without finishing the government employee test, classifying the
speech as purely private, the court would be to proceed to forum analysis and
strict scrutiny.101 The court would then have to choose a standard of review
based on the forum.102 If the court was following Rigdon’s forum analysis, the
military would be a designated public forum requiring strict scrutiny for any
content based speech restriction.103 Professor Green argues that the military has
established a limited public forum by allowing worship services.104 However, he
acknowledges that the limited forum only extends so far.105 Further, he argues
that a chaplains “interest may be curtailed by the military simply through the
elimination of the forum.”106
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Therefore, even if the court chose this unlikely alternative, it is highly
doubtful they would follow the Rigdon courts choice of forum. It is more likely
the court would classify the forum as non‐public, as it is a military base.107 Still,
the distinction here would make no difference because even as a non‐public
forum, strict scrutiny is still required for religious restrictions, as they are always
considered view point restrictions.108 If the court proceeded to strict scrutiny,
the military would not have a difficult time articulating a compelling interest. For
example, the court would likely find the implementation of the “Don’t Ask Don’t
Tell” repeal to be compelling. The only problem the military would face is having
the restrictions narrowly tailored. That was the aspect of strict scrutiny the
military failed to comply with in the Rigdon case.109 It is unlikely the court would
proceed with the latter possibility, especially given the doctrinal test for
government employees coupled with the fact that the Rigdon court was
assessing the military regulation on the chaplain’s speech and not the speech
itself.
The Supreme Court would have to make a fairly straightforward choice in
the initial stage of the analysis. The court would either classify the chaplain’s
speech as private, as Rigdon did, or pursuant to official duties, and thus
government speech, as the Garcetti court did. However, there may be a
constitutional problem with either classification. In creating the military
chaplaincy, the government had to restrict chaplains’ duties to only religious
duties in order to not run afoul of the establishment clause.110 The chaplains
were not able to have any “sovereign authority” because then the separation of
church and state would not be achieved.111 This indicates that all of the
chaplains’ duties are religious.112 If all the duties are religious, then preaching
and advising would always be pursuant to official duties and the court would be
forced to reject the alternative analysis posed by Rigdon separating religious and
official duties.
Yet, rejecting the alternative analysis and accepting Garcetti’s conclusion
that chaplain’s speech is government speech also threatens the principles of the
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establishment clause by attributing religious speech to the government.113 Green
elaborates on this conundrum when he explains that chaplains are employed by
the army to perform religious duties and in performing these duties they are
acting as government agents.114 Therefore, it would seem obvious that “their
religious speech and activity is government speech, not that of their own.”115
However, Green goes on to suggest that the “dual authorities” the military
regulations create,116 and are thus analyzed in Rigdon, make it seem as though
the “speech that accompanies a worship service or counseling session may not
necessarily be attributable to the government to justify the same type of
government constraints as have been legitimated in the Court’s government
employee jurisprudence.”117 His conclusion, referencing Professor Lupu and
Tuttle,118 is that the status of chaplains must be viewed as a “hybrid form of
government employee.”119 In simpler terms, the Court would need to essentially
determine which of the two classifications of the speech offends the
establishment clause less.
B. A Matter of Public Concern
As explained above, Connick stands for the proposition that speech on a
matter of public concern is more likely to be considered protected by the First
Amendment (even as a government employee), but is still subjected to a
balancing test.120 If the Chaplains speech was able to triumph over the Garcetti
standard, the speech would then be subject to the “public concern” test. The
Connick court explains that in order to determine if employee speech was a
public concern, it is necessary to look at content, form, and context, as well as
time, place, and manner.121 In general, “[W]hen a public employee speaks not as
a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon
matters of personal interest…”, the speech is not protected.122 The requirement
of “speech on a matter of public concern” can be viewed in a broad or a narrow
context. The chaplains’ speech would more likely be protected if the court
analyzed this requirement in a broad fashion.
113

Steven K. Green, supra note 104, at 182.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, supra note 52, at 164 (concluding that “a chaplains
speech in faith group worship, falls in a unique netherworld between a government
employee’s job‐related speech (restrictable under Garcetti) and the expression of a
private individual (protected against compulsion by Wooley and Barnette))”.
119
Id.
120
Connick, 461 U.S. 138.
121
Id. at 147.
122
Id.
114

2010–2011] The Diminishing Free Speech Rights of Military Chaplains

243

1. Narrow View
If the court takes a narrow view one of the things it would likely consider
is whether or not the speech brought to light the wrong doing of a public
institution. In Connick, the court considered the employee’s questionnaire at
issue as a matter of personal interest because she did not seek to discuss the
responsibilities of the institution to the public or bring light of wrongdoing of the
institution to the public.123 Rather she was attempting to gather ammunition for
another round of controversy with her superiors.124 In contrast, in Pickering, the
teacher was attempting to bring light of the wrongdoing of the school system to
the attention of the public.125 Under Pickering and Connick it is possible that
chaplains’ speech would be seen as a matter of public concern if they were
preaching against the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”. This could be interpreted
as chaplains attempting to show the disservice the military is doing to the public
by allowing the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”. However, following this line of
reasoning, if the chaplains were preaching against homosexuality, and not the
repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”, the court, like in Connick, may classify the
speech as simply ammunition against superiors. The Connick court explained that
an employee expressing contempt with the status quo falls into the category of
speech on a matter of personal interest.126 If the chaplains were preaching
against homosexuality, this could be interpreted as their personal moral
displeasure with the idea of homosexuals in the military. In other words, instead
of bringing to light what the military is doing wrong, they would simply be
expressing a personal opinion, which is at odds with message being portrayed by
superior officers in support of the repeal.
Support for this conclusion is found in Akridge v. Wilkinson.127 The
district court in Akridge explains that had the prison chaplain been commenting
on the social or legal ramifications in general about homosexuality, the speech
may have been protected.128 However, the chaplains personal opinions about
“whether the Protestant faith condemns homosexuality as a sin, regardless of
their validity, do not constitute matters of public concern.”129 This distinction
seems to support the conclusions that would be reached applying the Connick
analysis. Preaching against the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” would speak to
the social and legal ramifications of homosexuality. However, preaching against
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homosexuality in the general moral fashion associated with a chaplain’s faith,
would not constitute a matter of public concern. Further, the Akridge district
court explained that, “Plaintiffs views … would be sending a message to other
inmates of tolerance or acceptance of homosexuality incompatible with the
Protestant faith and plaintiff’s own beliefs do not involve matters of public
concern.” 130This, again, leads to the inference that preaching against
homosexuality, as a morale issue, in reference to tenants of a faith, would not be
speech on a matter of public concern. However, as explained below, the circuit
court in Akridge, partially agreed with the lower court, but also took a broader
view of public concern.131
The conclusion reached by this narrow view of “public concern” under
Connick, Pickering, and the district court in Akridge, is directly at odds with the
analysis of speech in Rigdon. The Rigdon’s courts assessment would lead to the
deduction that that the preaching would in fact have to be against
homosexuality and not about the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”. This is
because, as the Rigdon court explains, chaplains are not allowed to participate in
political activities while on duty.132 However, that regulation does not prevent
chaplains from “discussing the morality of current issues in their sermons or
religious teachings”.133 This would seem to indicate that the chaplains could
preach against homosexuality but not against the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t
Tell” because homosexuality could be considered a moral issue addressed in
religious teachings, while preaching against the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”
could be considered overtly political. However, it is possible, under this Rigdon
analysis, that preaching against “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” could still be allowed
because it could be classified as “indirect encouragement.”134 The Rigdon court
explained that the chaplains were not intending to directly influence the votes of
the soldiers, but rather suggesting they contact their respective legislative
members who would then vote regarding a piece of legislation.135 Therefore,
seemingly, military chaplains in this situation could possibly preach against
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” if re‐implementation of the policy was put up for
Congressional vote, but not popular vote.
Another clash between this “narrow view” and the Rigdon court analysis
is the impermissible use of speech, according to Connick, to “gather ammunition
against ones superiors.” 136This is because, according to the chaplain regulations,
130
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“there is no command relationship in the Chaplain corps.”137 It can be inferred
from this bylaw that chaplains in fact then are essentially unable to gather
ammunition against their superiors. Aden explains, “This prohibition precludes a
superior or subordinate relationship between chaplains when it comes to purely
religious matters, such as sermon content or aspects of religious activity.
Because there is no superior/subordinate relationship in matters of religion,
there can be no disrespect to a superior when discussing or defending a religious
practice.”138 This lack of superior relationship undermines the narrow view of
public concern because there can be no assumption that the speech’s purpose is
to “gather ammunition against superiors.”
2. Broad View
While the narrow view of the “public concern” aspect is one the court
could possibly take, it is much more likely that the court would take a broad
view. In Akridge, the circuit court (in reviewing the case), clarified that the
chaplain’s speech could be viewed as a “mixed speech” situation.139 It agreed
with the district courts assessment of the speech as private because his
statements were made about his authority as a chaplain to make final decisions
about worship. They also reasoned, using a broader view of “public concern”
that since the speech was about homosexuality, and the “propriety” of
homosexuality had been public debate in the national spectrum, there were
aspects of the speech that were matters of public concern.140 This broader view
seems to indicate that the chaplains’ speech against homosexuality would in fact
be on a matter of public concern.
The language in various Supreme Court decisions supports this broader
view. In San Diego v. Roe the court explained that “[P]ublic concern is something
that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest
and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication”.141 In Connick,
the court reasoned, that speech was on a matter of public concern when it can
“fairly be considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern in the community …”142 The Supreme Court recently cited to both of
those statements in the decision it handed down in the case of Snyder v.
Phelps.143 The court in Snyder begins its analysis of public concern by citing San
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Diego v. Roe144, which explains that, “the boundaries of the public concern test
are not well defined.”145 The court goes on to explain that, “Although that
remains true today, we have articulated some guiding principles … that accord
broad protection to speech to ensure that courts themselves do not become
inadvertent censors.”146 In Snyder, while the court admitted that the speech
could be hurtful, they concluded that the subject matter of the signs plainly fell
into a matter of public concern. Explaining their reasoning the court expressly
classified the issue of homosexuality as a matter of public concern.147 The court
said, “[T]he issues they [the signs] highlight –the political and moral conduct of
the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the
military, and scandals involving Catholic clergy–are matters of public import.”148
Since the Supreme Court has so recently classified homosexuality in the military
as a matter of public concern, it would be very unlikely for them to hold that the
chaplain’s speech in this instance was not on a matter of public concern.
However, it is necessary to acknowledge some of the other factors the court has
previously considered in assessing whether speech was on a matter of public
concern.
The fact that speech has a controversial nature would not undermine the
conclusion that the speech was in fact on a matter of public concern.149 For
example, in the case of Rankin v. McPherson, a clerical employee made
comments about killing the president.150 The court, acknowledging the Connick
context requirement, explained that, “The inappropriate or controversial
character of a statement is irrelevant to the question of whether it deals with a
matter of public concern.”151 More recently, in Snyder, the court cited this very
statement in explaining that although the speech fell short of “refined social or
political commentary”152 and “its contribution to public discourse may be
negligible” 153and it “inflicted great pain”154, it was still a matter of public
concern. The chaplains’ speech will surely be classified as controversial, and
therefore the Rankin and Snyder courts analysis is very helpful to the chaplains’
claims and further solidifies the likelihood that the court will take a broader view
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of public concern. However, the “controversial character” may still play into the
balancing test.
Another distinguishing factor that strengthens the argument in favor of
protecting the speech as a matter of public concern is that the speech in this
case is religious. In general, religious speech tends to receive more protection
and therefore155, religious speech is always a matter of public interest. Even if
the court takes the narrow view of public concern, as explained above, the fact
that the speech is religious may allow the chaplains to overcome the suggestion,
in Connick, that the speech must “bring to light the failure of a public
institution”. As the Rigdon court explained, they refused to distinguish between
religious speech and religious speech with political undertones.156 This is a very
positive point for the Chaplains. Since the speech in Connick was not religious, it
may have been given less deference than the speech in Rigdon. Meaning, the
court may give more deference to the chaplains, regarding the speech being a
matter of public concern, because they do not wish to split hairs over whether or
not preaching against homosexuality is religious or political. It is possible that the
court would be willing to say that the requirement of “bringing to light the
wrongdoing of an institution” is satisfied because by preaching against
homosexuality, it is implied that the chaplains were preaching against the repeal
of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” as well. If the court takes the broader view, it is even
more likely that the fact that the religious nature of the speech would be taken
into consideration.
As mentioned, it is extremely likely that the court would take the broad
view of public concern and accept that the chaplains’ speech against
homosexuality falls into this category. However, if the court holds that the
speech is not a matter of public concern, they will not even proceed to the final
requirement of the government employee analysis, the balancing test.157 The
court and Connick made it very clear that when the employee’s speech was not
on a matter of public concern, they had no reason to examine her
termination.158 As the Connick court explained, “Perhaps the government
employer’s dismissal of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary dismissals from
government service which violate no fixed tenure or applicable statute or
regulation are not subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the dismissal
are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable.” 159 Therefore, if the court found
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that the chaplain’s speech was not on a matter of public concern, the Court
would allow a chaplain to be terminated and stop the analysis.
C. Unduly Disruptive Speech: The Balancing Test
The purpose of the balancing test is for the court to weigh the interests
of an individual’s free speech with the government’s interest in proper
functioning.160 Both positions will be examined in turn. Again, the chaplains’
claims will only reach this point in the analysis if the court determines the speech
is not pursuant to official duties and the speech is found to be a matter of public
concern. In performing the balancing test, the court takes into consideration a
variety of factors to analyze the government’s interests.161 These factors include,
but are not limited to, whether or not the speech undermines the government
entity’s ability to perform, whether the speech impairs harmony among co‐
workers or has a detrimental impact on close working relationships, whether the
speech impedes the performance of the speakers duty, and whether or not the
speech is representative or attributable to the government employer.162 The
court will also consider historical deference to the military. On the opposing side,
the court will attempt to assess the free speech rights of the chaplains.163
1. Free Speech Rights of Chaplains
Historically, the free speech rights of individuals have been justified by
three major principles: the marketplace of ideas, democratic self‐government,
and personal autonomy.164 The marketplace of ideas approach maintains that
speech is important to facilitate numerous ideas circulating in society.165
Recently, the Snyder court reiterated the importance of this free speech
justification in saying, “As a Nation we have chosen a different course–to protect
even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public
debate.”166 This principle supports the idea that all viewpoints on homosexuality
need to be represented in the marketplace in order for people to come to their
own informed and reasoned viewpoint. All viewpoints are necessary in the
marketplace regardless of whether the ideas are true or false.167 Cate explains

160

Pickering, 390 U.S. 986 at 568.
Id.
162
Id; see also Connick, 461 U.S. 138; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410; see also Rankin,
483 U.S. 378; see also Roe, 543 U.S. 77.
163
See Akridge, 178 Fed.Appx.474.
164
Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, First Amendment Law 6–8 (Robert C. Clark et
al. eds., 4th ed. 2010).
165
Id.
166
Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751, slip op at 15.
167
Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 164, at 6.
161

2010–2011] The Diminishing Free Speech Rights of Military Chaplains

249

this idea of “truth” from a perspective of John Stuart Mill.168 She explains that
the freedom of expression, according to Mill, is based on the very idea that the
“expression of dissenting opinions, regardless of whether they are true, partially
true, or false, aids in the discovery of truth.”169 The Rankin court also supports
this argument when they explain, “Just as erroneous statements must be
protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive,
so statements criticizing public policy and implementation of it must be similarly
protected.”170 Here, the chaplains are circulating one idea against
homosexuality. It is arguably very important to have the viewpoints of chaplains
on homosexuality, from a religious standpoint, in order to further enrich the
marketplace. In addition, this particular viewpoint may encourage those who
believe in homosexuality to speak out.
A problem with this viewpoint is that there is always the possibility that
the speech has the opposite effect of encouraging people to speak out and in
fact silences the opposition. This is problematic for chaplains because this is
exactly what repealing “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” is attempting to prevent. Another
criticism of the marketplace of ideas justification is that the marketplace itself
only caters to the ideas of the majority, or those with the dominant viewpoint.171
Cate explains, “Society often engages in oppressive practices because a majority
is so convinced it has the truth on its side, that it feels justified in silencing
individuals who hold other opinions…” 172 Since the chaplains are in a position of
power, their viewpoint against homosexuality could be seen as majoritarian,
thus, forcing out minority views from the marketplace. In fact, it is very possible
that some chaplains could believe the truth is on their side, based on their
religious convictions, and are therefore validated in attempting to silence those
who believe in homosexuality. However, this majority viewpoint is not
necessarily a negative aspect in the market place of ideas. For example, Justice
Holmes argues that it is true that minority groups should be entitled to free
speech as well, but only in order to become the majority or the dominant
view.173 In other words, “free speech facilitates the implementation of the ideas
held by shifting majorities at any given time.”174 Under this rationale, even if
chaplains’ speech is viewed as majoritarian, those who oppose their viewpoint
still have the ability to counter their arguments. Thus, the majoritarian nature of
168
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their speech against homosexuality may not be fatal to the market place of ideas
justification.
The democratic self‐government justification is grounded on the idea that
free speech serves four major functions: The first function allows the public to
gather knowledge and vote wisely.175 The Connick court explains this aspect of
the First Amendment, “The explanation for the Constitution’s special concern
with threats to the right of citizens to participate in political affairs is no mystery.
The First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”176
This likely hurts the chaplains argument because not only are they not allowed to
endorse specific voting preferences, but, “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” has already been
repealed and therefore the change has already occurred. However, it is always
possible that the policy would be reinstated and, therefore, the speech against
homosexuality contributes to deliberation and allows for possible change
through reinstatement of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”. The second function is to shape
and contribute to deliberation and allow for change.177 The Pickering court
placed great emphasis on this contribution to deliberation made by the teachers.
They explained that the teachers are the members of the community most likely
to have informed opinions about school funding, and it is therefore crucial that
they be able to express their views.178 Chaplains also have informed and definite
opinions about homosexuality in the military. However, the court may not be
willing to recognize that they should speak out because, in contrast to the
teachers in Pickering, their opinions do not necessarily relate directly to the
functioning of he military with homosexuals, but rather are colored by a religious
bias.
The third function free speech serves is to prevent government abuse of
power. This justification may work for or against chaplains. The repeal of
“Don’t Ask Don’t tell” could be seen as the government in fact correcting its prior
abuse of power by now allowing soldiers that fight for our nation to be openly
homosexual. However, the chaplains may argue that this is simply shadowing the
religious viewpoint. As one author explains, “Critics familiar with the Army
presentation [training for implementation of repeal], however, say the military is
essentially telling chaplains who are not theologically conservative that they are
not welcome.”180 The chaplains may argue that outlawing a religious viewpoint is
equally as much of a government abuse of power as outlawing a homosexual
179
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viewpoint. The final and fourth function of speech is that it promotes political
stability by allowing a safe avenue for dissent.181 This is a crucial aspect for the
military chaplains. They need a safe place to disagree with implementation of
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” since they do not endorse homosexuality. If the chaplains
are prevented from sharing an opposing viewpoint then they have no avenue to
express their views unless they choose to resign from the military.
Personal autonomy is one of the most important validations behind free
speech.182 The ability to express oneself and not be censored is an idea that lies
at the heart of the First Amendment.183 As for the autonomy of chaplains,
arguably, their religious beliefs are essentially how they define their “sense of
self”. Without this autonomy to express their religious views, chaplains are
censored regarding the speech that essentially defines them. If the court chose
to follow the Rigdon analysis, the military should not be able to censor the
religious speech of chaplains. The court says, “The chaplains in this case seek to
preach only what they would tell their non military congregants. There is no
need for heavy‐handed censorship, and any attempt to impinge on the plaintiffs
constitutional and legal rights is not acceptable.”184 Clearly the Rigdon court
finds the autonomy of the chaplains to weigh against the interest of the
military.185 However, in that case the chaplains were preaching against abortion
and the military policy was against political endorsement. Here, the interests are
far more contrasting. In this case, military chaplains would preach against
homosexuality while the military is simultaneously trying to implement a policy
tolerating homosexuality.
In consideration of all the above factors, weighing in favor of protecting
the speech of chaplains, it is still likely the court would rule that the balancing
test favors the military. Although the First Amendment is a fundamental aspect
of our nation, if the court has to choose between the free speech rights of a
group, and national security, they likely will not chose the former. While the
marketplace of ideas, democratic self‐government, and personal autonomy, are
free speech justifications that date back to the making of our Constitution, in this
instance, they will likely not triumph over the government’s interest. The views
of the chaplains and the military do not differ slightly. They do not involve a
small policy decision or a minor alteration of regulations. They are diametrically
181
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opposed. As explained below, the speech here threatens the unique inter‐
workings of the military and that is not something the Court will be willing to
allow.
2. Government’s Interest
If the individuals speech undermines the government entity’s ability to
function efficiently, it is likely the court will consider the speech to be unduly
disruptive.186 The Connick court explained the importance of this factor in saying,
“The Pickering balance requires full consideration of the government’s interest in
the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public.”187 The
court tends to be very deferential to the employer when analyzing this factor.188
For example, in Connick, the court explained that even if the speech has not yet
harmed the workplace, measures could be taken in order to avoid disruption. 189
Following this analysis, the chaplain’s speech against homosexuality would
greatly undermine the military’s ability to perform. Preaching against
homosexuality directly opposes the goals of repealing “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and
creating uniform tolerance. It is quite possible, under this reasoning, that even if
the preaching against homosexuality had not created problems, the military
could still engage in preventative measures. The deference the Akridge court
showed to prison officials190, in holding that the speech was not protected, is a
huge obstacle for the military chaplains. The court explained that even if the
speech touches on a matter of public concern, “…[It] will not be constitutionally
protected unless the employee’s interest in speaking on these issues outweighs
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.”191 In Akridge, the court found
the “scales” in the Pickering analysis to tip heavily for the prison officials.192 They
held for the prison officials regardless of their finding that the chaplain’s speech
did not impede his duties or impair harmony among co‐workers.193 The fact that
the speech undermined the interests of the prison in preventing discrimination
based on sexual orientation194 was dispositive enough to rule against the
chaplain. This situation is analogous, if not expressly parallel, to that of the
military chaplains. Simply put, if the court finds this factor in the balancing test
to be as important as the other courts have, it is likely that they will hold that
preaching against homosexuality to undermine the military’s legitimate interest
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in implementing the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and preventing
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
While no further analysis is really necessary, other factors do point in the
military’s favor. Speech that impairs the harmony among co‐workers and has a
detrimental impact on close working relationships, for which personal loyalty
and confidence are necessary, will likely not be protected.195 In Pickering, the
court found that the teachers role with the Board and the Superintendent were
not close enough relationships in which “loyalty and confidence were necessary
for their proper functioning.”196 The opposite would be true for military
chaplains. The military could easily make an argument that loyalty and
confidence were in fact foundational requirements among all members of the
military and their superiors. Preaching against homosexuality would threaten
relationships with chaplains and superiors as well as chaplains and soldiers with
opposing views. Further, preaching against homosexuality could threaten
soldiers’ relationships with each other. For example, soldiers that disagreed with
homosexuality may interpret the chaplain’s message as an endorsement to
openly oppose homosexuality and fellow soldiers that were homosexual. In
Connick, the court explained, “When close working relationships are essential to
fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s
judgment is appropriate.”197 Again, this is problematic for chaplains. Following
the Connick analysis, great deference would be given to the military because
close working relationships are essential for the military in fulfilling public
responsibilities.198 The military would have a sound argument because when
soldiers are fighting for their lives, trust, loyalty, and confidence, are critical.
If an individual’s speech impedes the performance of his or her own duty,
then the court will likely hold that it is unduly disruptive.199 In Pickering, the
court reasoned that the speech was protected because it did not impair the
teacher’s ability to function in his everyday duties in the classroom.200 For the
chaplains, preaching or advising against homosexuality (ie: gay marriage,
domestic partnership, children of gay couples) may interfere with their duties. If
the chaplains did not want to advise about homosexuality, they would not be
fulfilling the military’s requirement that chaplains counsel all soldiers. Equally as
important, if the chaplains do advise about homosexuality (in a positive light), it
is impeding their duty to the religious organization that is endorsing them, as the
chaplains would not be staying true to their religious tenants. If this occurs, it is
195
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likely the chaplains would lose endorsement from their respective religious
organizations and slowly certain denominations of chaplains would diminish in
the military.201 This may create a contrast with the idea of the government entity
being able to function correctly. It is a double‐edged sword. If the chaplains do
speak out, the military’s purpose of repealing “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” is
threatened. If the chaplains don’t speak out, they possibly lose their
endorsement and are no longer able to participate as a chaplain in the military,
also threatening the organization of the military. The court may be required to
choose which consequence they believe to be the lesser of two evils.
When an individual’s speech, especially if controversial, is attributable to,
or representative of the government entity, it is less likely to be granted
protection.202 The Rankin court noted that the level of the position in the
government office is important to this analysis.203 In Rankin, because McPherson
was only a clerical employee, her speech was not attributable to the office.204
This could be problematic for the chaplains because their preaching against
homosexuality, in partially military uniform, as it is required at all times205, could
very easily be attributable to the military. The uniform would definitely be a
consideration, albeit not a dispositive factor. As the court in San Diego v. Roe
explains, “Roes expression was widely broad‐cast, linked to his official status as a
police officer, and designed to exploit his employer’s image.”206 Part of the
reason the Roe court linked the speech at issue to the employer (the police
department) was because he was wearing a police uniform.207 Following this
reasoning, it would be very easy for the court to find that since the chaplains are
in partial military uniform while preaching against homosexuality, it is
attributable to the government entity in a harmful way and therefore cannot be
protected. However, the analysis of the uniform in Roe was in regards to
whether or not the speech was on a matter of public concern.208 This distinction
however, would not change the likely outcome for the military chaplains. In
addition, under Rigdon, religious speech is separate and some of what the
chaplains say is not considered official.209 Therefore, this analysis of whether or
201
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not the speech was representative of the military would depend on whether or
not the court accepted the notion that chaplains’ religious capacity was separate
from their official capacity.
a. Historical Deference to the Military
In performing the Pickering analysis, it is impossible to ignore the general
principle that courts afford great deference to the military. The explanation
behind this deference is relatively simple. The consequences of the court issuing
a decision that impedes the functioning of the military are grave. The military
protects our nation, and if it were unable to perform properly, our national
security would be at issue. Captain John Carr explained the idea of deference
succinctly in his article, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance
Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, when he referred to the military
as a separate community.210 He explained that the court must be deferential to
the military based upon “the unique military mission, the critical importance of
obedience and subordination, and the complimentary development of military
custom.”211 Carr further explained that, “Based upon one or more of these
characteristics, courts confronted with free speech issues in the military context
typically refuse to apply the free speech protections afforded civilians or other
government employees, preferring to defer to the military’s judgment of the
potential disruptive effect of the speech in question.”212
This principle is exemplified by the Supreme Court case of Goldman v.
Weinberger.213 In this case, the court holds that a restriction preventing an
officer from wearing a yarmulke, because of religious beliefs, is valid if the
military believes the practice would “detract from the uniformity sought by dress
regulations.”214 The courts rationale illustrates the deference principle. The
Goldman court reasons, “whether or not expert witnesses find that the religious
exceptions are desirable is quite beside the point. The desirability of dress
regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and
they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered
professional judgment.”215 While this case analyzed a free exercise claim, lower
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courts have dealt directly with free speech claims in the military and also were
extremely deferential. In the case of Ethredge v. Hail, the military outlawed
bumper stickers that would embarrass the president.216 The court ruled that
military officials need not demonstrate actual harm before implementing a
regulation restricting speech.217 Further, the court explained, “[W]e must remain
mindful that the military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the
extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First
Amendment; to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive
obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.” 218 The Ethredge court also
noted that “[C]ourts are ill‐equipped to determine the impact upon discipline
that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have…”219
It is clear that the military’s interests are extremely strong in regards to
preaching against homosexuality. Seemingly, the Pickering balance favors the
government in the case at hand. Not only is the judicial system extremely
deferential to the military in general, but the speech against homosexuality
severely undermines the military’s ability to function efficiently. The speech
undermines this ability by destroying harmony among co‐workers, in a job where
loyalty, confidence, and trust are of utmost importance. The speech further
destroys the efficiency of the military by impeding the duties of the chaplains
themselves, both to the military, and to their respective religious organizations.
Finally, the speech is directly attributable to the military in a negative fashion,
and thus prevents the military from obtaining their goal of successfully
implementing the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”. The only aspect of the
analysis that undercuts the military’s interest is the idea that if the chaplains are
not allowed to preach against homosexuality, their endorsement from their
respective religious agency could be removed, and the military chaplaincy as a
program could suffer the loss of various denominations. However, if the court is
faced between choosing either a possibly Unitarian military chaplaincy, or the
downfall of unity in the military, due to lack of tolerance furthered by preaching
against homosexuality, it is almost certain to chose the former. Even if the
chaplains prevail through the first two aspects of the government employee test,
the speech at issue will lose its protection here.
VII. COMPELLED SPEECH
Compelled speech is interpreted as the right not to speak or to have a
message attributed to you that you do not wish to convey.220 The chaplains may
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have compelled speech claims in two different situations: If chaplains had to
administer religious rites to all congregants who attended their services,
regardless of sexual orientation, or if the chaplains were required to preach or
advise about homosexuality in a positive fashion without the right to opt out.
A. Applicable Precedent
The seminal case regarding compelled speech is West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette.221 This case stands for the proposition that under the Bill
of Rights the government cannot compel you to speak when you do not want
to.222 The court explains the importance of their holding in saying, “to sustain a
compulsory flag salute, we are required to say that the Bill of Rights, which
guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it open to public
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.”223 This rationale is
very favorable to the chaplains. It is clear by the language of this case that
military superiors should not be allowed to force military chaplains to counsel or
advise about something that they do not believe. The Barnette court also
reasons that they cannot foresee any possible exception to this compelled
speech doctrine. 224 The court says, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”225 Here,
the court specifically mentions religion, and states that no authority can dictate
what is conventional in the religious sphere.226 Again, this is favorable to the
chaplains compelled speech claims. The court clearly understands the First
Amendment as a protection against forced speech.227
Another landmark case dealing with compelled speech is Wooley v.
Maynard.228 Here, a group of Jehovah’s witnesses challenged the law requiring
residents to have the state motto on their license plates.229 The court found that
the state was “forcing an individual as part of his daily life, to be an instrument
for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable. In doing so, the state invades the sphere of intellect and the spirit
221
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of the First Amendment.”230 Clearly, under this analysis, if the chaplains were
forced to administer sacraments to homosexuals or advise homosexuals in a way
that is contrary to their religion, the speech would be classified as compelled
speech. It certainly forces the chaplains to foster adherence to an ideological and
religious point of view that is contrary to their beliefs.
B. Summary of Court’s Test
The main difference between the government employee test and the one
used for compelled speech is the distinction between analysis of speech vs.
analysis of regulations. If the Chaplains brought claims against the existing
regulations, or hypothetical regulations, they would likely not be analyzed under
the government employee analysis. The government employee analysis would
take place if the chaplains were fired for their speech or for refusing to comply
with regulations.231 In that situation the court is required to examine the speech
of the chaplains. There is still a possibility that the court may analyze regulations
under the government employee test and therefore the analysis would follow as
explained in the first section. It is more likely, however, that if the chaplains were
questioning the Constitutionality of regulations, rather then the constitutionality
of their dismissal for certain speech, the court would use a different test. The
court will first assess whether or not the regulation is dealing with speech or
conduct.232 The next question will be whether the regulation is content neutral,
or content based.233 If it is content neutral then it must further a substantial
government interests and must be sufficiently tailored to achieve that
purpose.234 There also needs to be alternative channels of communication.235 If
the regulation is content based, the court will determine if it is subject matter
discrimination or viewpoint discrimination.236 The former restricts both sides of
the debate while the later restricts only one.237 All content‐based regulations
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require a strict scrutiny analysis unless they are subject matter restrictions in a
non‐public forum.238
C. Existing Regulations
As explained above, in the current law for chaplains, the mission of
chaplains is to support religious, spiritual, moral, and ethical needs of the
army.239 Chaplains must contribute to the spiritual well being of soldiers.240 All
soldiers are entitled to chaplain service and support.241 The court would likely
interpret these regulations as content neutral regulations of conduct, not
speech. These would be regulations that incidentally affect speech.242 Therefore,
the regulations would be subject to intermediate scrutiny.243 The test for
intermediate scrutiny dictates that there must be a significant governmental
interest where the means are sufficiently tailored to meet that interest.244
Further, the government interest cannot be related to the suppression of speech
and alternative channels of communication must be available.245 The military
would not have a difficult time establishing a substantial government interest.
They could articulate their interest as providing religious and moral support for
all of the soldiers in the army. Since the Supreme Court already held this to be a
legitimate interest in Katcoff v. Marsh246, the military would pass this threshold
with ease. As for the regulations being sufficiently tailored to achieve the
purpose, the military would argue the regulations were tailored because
chaplains are aware of the requirements, which view all denominations equally,
and specifically state that chaplains must be available to counsel all command
members.247 The last aspect of the test, alternative means of communication,
may be more difficult for the military to prove. If the regulations are interpreted
to bar the chaplains from preaching against homosexuality as well as require the
chaplains to counsel regarding homosexuality, chaplains may not have other
means of expression. However, given the likely conclusion that the military base
is a non‐public forum, the court may be extremely deferential to the military.
238
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Further, the fact that chaplains were on notice of the bylaws regulating their
activity also supports the likely constitutionality of the regulations.
D. Hypothetical Regulations
1. Rites
One possible regulation that the military could implement would be that
chaplains administer rites to all soldiers who wanted to participate. The military
may want to have a regulation, such as this, to facilitate tolerance. Allowing all
soldiers to participate in religious rites, regardless of their sexual preference,
would send a message of unity. Essentially, this type of directive would prevent
homosexuals from being “singled out” due to their lack of involvement. Here,
compelled speech issues arise if, for example, if a chaplain was forced, against
his faith, to administer communion to an openly homosexual soldier. However,
this regulation likely would not even need analysis by the court because the
military laws specifically state that chaplains are not required to take part in
worship when in variance with the tenets of their faith.248 In essence, this by law
is an opt out provision for chaplain preaching.
2. Counseling In a Positive Fashion
Another regulation the military may be interested in executing is the
requirement that chaplains counsel about homosexuality in a positive fashion.
Since all chaplains are required to be available to counsel soldiers249, the military
may want to make sure that chaplains are not counseling against homosexuality.
This military would likely provide parallel reasoning for needing this restriction
along side the restriction about preaching against homosexuality. If chaplains
could not preach against homosexuality for legitimate reasons outlined by the
military, it would make little sense that they could counsel against it behind
closed doors. Obviously, for chaplains, this creates a compelled speech claim.
While chaplains likely recognize their responsibility to counsel command
members, if they are unable to advise against homosexuality, then they are
forced to convey a message they do not believe in. In Barnette, the court held
this was unacceptable even for the pledge of allegiance.250 They explained, “It
must also be noted that the pledge requires affirmation of belief and an attitude
of mind.”251 As previously mentioned, in the section on current applicable
chaplain law, some of these duties to counsel include assisting in family
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difficulties and contributing to the enrichment of the marriage and family.252 If
chaplains are forced to counsel on the issue of gay marriage or domestic
partnerships, and it is contrary to their faith, they face a clash between their
duty to the military and their religious tenets.
If the chaplains challenged the constitutionality of this regulation the
court would likely hold it to be a content based and viewpoint based restriction
on speech. The regulation is viewpoint based because it is requiring chaplains to
essentially say good things about homosexuality and not bad things. This
removes the chaplain’s viewpoint from the marketplace of ideas. This kind of
regulation is subject to strict scrutiny.253 In order to pass strict scrutiny, the
military would need to first prove a compelling government interest. Again, this
would not be difficult. The interest would be articulated as the implementation
of repealing “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and achieving unified message to the soldiers.
Secondly, the military would need to prove that the restriction, not
allowing chaplains to counsel against homosexuality, was narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling interest. This is where the military may run into
problems. For example, the military could instead designate chaplains who were
willing to discuss homosexuality in counseling sessions and leave out those who
do not wish to address the subject. This would allow chaplains that wanted to
opt out the ability to do so, but it would still provide advice and positive
counseling to homosexuals who wanted to speak to chaplains. However, the
military may argue that allowing “opting out” undermines their compelling
interest. For example, if certain chaplains are allowed to opt out of counseling
homosexuals, this may create an internal stigma against homosexuals in the
military. The military may argue that all the soldiers, gay or straight, know which
chaplains agree with homosexuality and which ones don’t, based on who is
willing to counsel on the matter. Regardless of this possible minor undermining
in the military’s interest, in order for the regulation to be narrowly tailored, the
“opt out” provision for counseling may be constitutionally required. The
Maynard court explains this principle well in the context of a states interest to
appreciate “history, state pride, and individualism.”254 While the court holds that
the state “[M]ay pursue such interests in any number of ways.”255 They continue
on to say, “Where the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter
how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First
Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”256 Simply
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put, without the “opt out” clause the regulation likely would not pass
constitutional muster.
Yet a different problem arises when opting out simply is not a feasible
option. For example, if there is only one military chaplain stationed with a
particular command unit that is deployed, or even one chaplain assigned to a
particular military base. Unfortunately for chaplains in this situation, at first
glance, the military’s regulation may prevail. After all, the military really would
not have any other way to make the restriction more narrowly tailored. If no
other chaplains are present then the “opt out” provision is moot. In this
particular situation, it is possible that chaplains would have to counsel soldiers
about homosexuality in a positive fashion. However, it is difficult to imagine that
the Supreme Court would allow this type of compelled speech, even in light of
historical military deference. Another possible result is that the court would
require the military to set up some sort of screening process. For example, if a
command is only assigned one chaplain, the military would have to station only
chaplains that would be willing to counsel positively about homosexuality. This is
the more likely result as it would make the regulation narrowly tailored.
It is likely that all of the chaplains claims against compelled speech would
prevail. While the government may be able to impose censorship, forcing
chaplains to counsel against their beliefs is unconstitutional. While all of the
above solutions, making the compelled speech regulations narrowly tailored,
seem feasible, none of them would cure the problem of those who wished to
counsel against homosexuality. This is where the censorship claim overlaps with
the compelled speech claim. Forcing chaplains to counsel in a positive fashion is
compelled speech, not allowing chaplains to counsel in a negative fashion is
censorship. As the above analysis indicates, the first of the two restrictions are
probably unconstitutional but, as the censorship section explained, the latter
restriction is likely constitutional. It is true that in the context of the military,
courts are very deferential. In fact, the state interest articulated in this situation
is particularly strong and may even signal more deference then usual to the
military. However, the Barnette court makes it abundantly clear that the
legitimate interest in pursuing unity and national security cannot be attained by
infringing on the First Amendment rights of individuals.257 The court says,
“National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example
is not in question. As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so
strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Compulsory unification
of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”258
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court will be faced with a question it has never before
addressed. While it has legitimized the chaplaincy in the legislature, and
seemingly endorsed the legality of the military chaplaincy, through in‐action, and
establishment clause decisions following Katcoff, the Court has never ruled on
the individual free speech rights of military chaplains. The first and most difficult
question for the court will be deciding whether or not chaplain speech is
pursuant to an official duty. Following the conclusions of Professor Green and
both Professor Lupu and Tuttle, the court will likely have to create a “hybrid
approach” between Rigdon and Garcetti. Garcetti is simply too narrow and
Rigdon is far too broad. Once the court creates this test, a seemingly impossible
fusion of private speech and government speech, they will easily determine that
the speech of chaplains, against homosexuality, is on a matter of public concern.
However, at the onset of the balancing test, the chaplains’ free speech claims
will be approaching defeat. The court will likely hold that it is impossible to
reconcile the chaplains’ individual speech rights with the interests of the military.
Following the historical tendency, great deference will be given to the military.
Regulations censoring chaplain’s ability to openly preach and counsel against
homosexuality may be held Constitutional. However, it is improbable the Court
would allow directives forcing chaplains to counsel about homosexuality in a
positive fashion. This type of regulation is far to invasive on First Amendment
freedoms.
At first glance, the modern trend of invading individual liberties for the
interest of national security will again prevail. Free speech rights of chaplains will
take a backseat to the goals and objectives of the military. However,
simultaneously, the individual liberties of homosexuals are being afforded vast
Constitutional protection. The court will surely take these factors into
consideration. While the law is too blurred to determine the exact analysis the
court will employ, it is undeniable that the social forces on the issue of religion
and homosexuality are at a heightened alertness. It is in this setting that the
Supreme Court will likely decide some of the most legally critical, and socially
relevant, free speech cases, of this time.

